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Abstract 
 
The capability of an employee to violate the policy 
of an organization is a concern for an employer. 
Monitoring is a measure taken by an employer to 
discourage an employee from acting inappropriately. 
However, current monitoring techniques tend to raise 
privacy issues because they violate the privacy rights 
of employees. Applying a monitoring technique without 
violating the privacy of employees is the aim of this 
paper. We propose a design and a protocol which give 
an employer the opportunity to monitor employee 
email in order to detect company policy violations. 
This can be achieved without violating the privacy of 
honest employees, while at the same time revealing 
evidence about the illegal actions of dishonest 
employees. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Information systems (IS) are widely used in 
organizations and usually accessible from non-trusted 
networks, e.g. the Internet. In such cases an IS has a 
large number of potential attackers threats coming 
from inside the organisation (internal threats) which 
should not be underestimated [1]. There are studies [2] 
showing the high frequency and impact of insider 
attacks on an organization’s IS. The impact and the 
frequency of policy violations by employees have 
driven organizations to find measures to detect and 
prevent them. In an attempt to discourage insider 
personnel from acting illegally, a monitoring system 
can be effective [2]. However, monitoring systems 
which violate the privacy rights of personnel raise 
privacy concerns, and are not acceptable in some 
countries such as the European Union [3]. On the one 
side, an employer wants to control the actions of 
employees in order to detect actions which violate the 
policy. On the other side, employees want to enjoy 
their rights to privacy and to believe they are trusted by 
the employer. 
In this paper we propose an email monitoring 
technique which allows internal users/personnel to 
keep their emails confidential as long as they do not 
violate the policy of their organisation. The structure of 
the paper is as follows: in Section 2 we introduce our 
email monitoring technique, in Section 3 we analyse it 
and we conclude the paper in Section 4. 
 
2. Methodology 
The aim of the proposed solution is to prevent and 
detect illegal emails (emails which violate the agreed 
policy of the organisation) from being exchanged 
without violating the privacy of honest personnel. An 
agent, which is located at the side of the user (in this 
case, the employee), and the Server Agent (SA), which 
is located at the side of the employer, co-operate before 
the employee sends or receives any email message. 
The email server is located at the side of the employer. 
For simplicity, we assume that the SA plays the role of 
the email server as well. 
The agent and the SA are provided by a trusted third 
entity, such as a government authority, which is the 
owner of the software applications. This entity is 
responsible for checking regularly whether the agent 
has been modified. However, neither the employee nor 
the employer needs to rely on this authority because 
the actions of the agent and the SA are accountable. 
The agent can calculate and store information such as 
secret keys. It does not have access to the resources of 
the user’s computer, apart from information exchanged 
by the user. Moreover, the agent does not have access 
to the communication means. Only the user is 
responsible for sending and receiving messages. 
Whenever the agent wants to send a message to the 
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SA, the agent must give the message to the user and 
the user will forward it. 
The notation used in this paper is as follows: 
{msg}KSaKey:The msg is encrypted (symmetric) by 
using the aKey. 
{msg}KpubKey:The msg is encrypted (asymmetric) by 
using the pubKey. 
{cipher}DSaKey: The cipher is decrypted (symmetric) 
by using the aKey 
{cipher}DprivKey: The cipher is decrypted (asymmetric) 
by using the privKey 
SprivKey(msg): The msg is signed using the privKey. 
IsEncrypted(msg): The function returns true if the msg 
is encrypted. Otherwise it returns false. 
IsLegal(msg, Version): The function returns true if the 
msg does not violate the rules of the specific Version 
(each version represents a different set of rules). 
Otherwise, it returns false. 
 
2.1 Steps in the proposed protocol 
We divide the protocol into two parts. The first part 
takes place when the user is sending an email; the 
second part takes place when the user is receiving an 
email. Therefore, an employer will be able to detect 
violation of the policy for incoming and outgoing 
emails. An agent has its own pair of keys 
(AGENTpublic-key/AGENTprivate-key). A user has 
no access to the private key of the agent. A user has 
two pairs of keys. The first key-pair (USER-
AGENTpublic-key/USER-AGENTprivate-key) is 
given to the agent only to encrypt and decrypt 
messages on behalf of the user. The second key-pair 
(USERpublic-key/USER-private-key) is used only for 
signing and verifying messages. There are two reasons 
for letting the user have two pairs of keys: 
• Allows the user (and a remote communication 
entity) to use an asymmetric cryptosystem, while 
the agent is able to decrypt and examine incoming 
emails. 
• Prevents the agent from signing a message on 
behalf of the user. The agent knows only the USER-
AGENTprivate-key; therefore, the agent can only 
encrypt and decrypt messages. The agent cannot 
sign on behalf of the user without knowing the 
USERprivate-key. 
 
2.1.1. Part 1 - Sending a message 
Figure 1 illustrates the participating entities for each 
step during the sending procedure, and follows the 
actual protocol. During the first 3 steps, the agent and 
the SA share a number of session secret keys. 
 
Figure 1 - The process while sending an email 
1) The agent asks the user to request keys from the SA  
Agent →User: “request keys” 
The agent asks the user to request session keys 
when the agent has few or none unused session keys 
available. It is up to the user to contact the SA in order 
to request session keys. Without session keys, the 
agent cannot encrypt and send messages to the SA. The 
agent cannot even decrypt and forward an incoming 
message to the user. 
2) The user requests a number (NumKeys) of keys 
from the SA. Each key (session key) will be used by 
the agent to encrypt the messages (step 5) during a 
communication session between the agent and the SA.  
User →SA: SUSERprivate-key (“request”, NumKeys) 
3) The SA sends the keys to the agent. Although the 
user has access to the exchanged information, he 
cannot have access to the key, because it is encrypted 
with the public key (AGENTpublic-key) of the agent. 
SA →Agent: SSAprivate-key(ID, {key}KAGENTpublic-key) 
4) The user signs and sends the desired email as well 
as any cryptographic parameter to the agent. The 
DataMsg is the actual email. The CryptoPar could be 
anything (apart from the USERprivate-key). For 
example, the CryptoPar could contain the 
SERVERpublic-key. The SERVERpublic-key is the 
public key of the destination entity which the user 
wants to communicate with. Instead of the server’s 
public key, it could be a secret key. In case the user 
wants to offer non-repudiation of the exchanged 
message, he can include in the CryptoPar the signed 
value of the DataMsg or the signed value of the 
CipherDataMsg. 
User→Agent:SUSERprivate-key(DataMsg, CryptoPar) 
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The agent determines whether the DataMsg is 
encrypted. If the DataMsg is encrypted, then the agent 
will stop processing the user’s request. Otherwise, the 
agent examines the validity of the DataMsg and in case 
the DataMsg is legal, it uses the parameters given by 
the user for encryption/signing. This encryption 
prevents the SA having access to the DataMsg. If the 
DataMsg has been characterized as illegal, then the 
agent will not encrypt the message based on the 
requirements (CryptoPar) of the user: Suppose the 
parameter includes the public key of the SERVER 
because the user wants to offer message 
confidentiality. The following algorithm shows the 
actions of the agent. 
IF NOT isEncrypted (DataMsg) AND isLegal 
(DataMsg, Version) THEN 
    CipherDataMsg= {DataMsg}KSERVERpublic-key 
    Msg=  CipherDataMsg 
ELSE IF NOT isLegal (DataMsg, Version) THEN 
      Msg=SUSERprivate-key(DataMsg, CryptoPar) 
ELSE Stop processing the user’s request 
END IF 
5) Before sending the Msg to the SA, it encrypts the 
Msg with a key. The key has been given by the SA on 
step 3. However, the user has no access to that key. 
Agent →SA:SAGENTprivate-key( {Msg, Flag}KSkey, ID, 
Version) 
Based on the given ID, the SA knows which key the 
agent has used to encrypt the message. The agent is 
required to use the ID as described in step 3. 
Otherwise, the agent could have a hidden 
communication with the SA and act maliciously. The 
user is able to check the order of the IDs. This 
communication is the most critical from the privacy 
violation point of view. The agent sends an encrypted 
message to the SA. The agent could act maliciously 
and reveal private information of the user, such as a 
credit card number found in the user’s computer. 
However, in a later step (step 8) we require that the SA 
must provide enough evidence about the content of that 
message. Therefore, the sent message of the agent is 
accountable, and any malicious attempt to violate the 
privacy of the user will be detected. 
The value of the Flag (found in step 5) represents 
the identities (RuleID) of the rules the message 
violates. If there is no violation of any rule then the 
value of the Flag is zero. In case the Flag is zero, the 
SA has no access to that Msg because it is encrypted. 
However, in case the Flag is not zero, it means that the 
Msg has been characterized (by the agent) as illegal 
and the Msg is not encrypted. 
6) The SA decrypts the Data and forwards the Msg to 
the destination, only in case the Msg is legal. 
SA →SERVER: Msg 
Although the SA is able to identify whether a Msg 
is malicious or not based on the Flag, the SA is not 
able to have access to the content of the Msg, in case 
the Msg is encrypted. The SA will be able to have 
access to the content of the Msg only if the Msg is 
malicious. 
7) The user asks the SA to provide evidence showing 
to the user that the exchanged messages did not violate 
the privacy of the user 
User→SA:SUSERprivate-key(ID)  
8) The SA sends the evidence 
SA →User:{SSAprivate-key(key,ID,Version)}KUSERpublic-key   
The user verifies whether the agent has sent (in step 
5) private information to the SA. Also, the Flag must 
be zero if the message was considered legal. 
Otherwise, the Flag contains the IDs of the rules that 
the message violates. If the key given in step 8 can 
decrypt the [{Msg, Flag}KSkey] from step 5 and the 
Msg is indeed the expected one, then the key (from 
step 8) is the one used. Otherwise, it is not the valid 
key. 
 
2.1.2. Part 2 - Receiving a message 
Figure 2 illustrates the participating entities for each 
step during the receiving procedure, and follows the 
actual protocol. 
9) The SA receives a message from an Internet user. 
Based on the DestEmailAddress, the SA determines 
the destination of the email. 
ReceivedMsg=DestEmailAddress+ 
{ReceivedDataMsg}KUSER-AGENTpublic-key 
Remote User →SA: ReceivedMsg 
 
10) The SA encrypts, signs and forwards the received 
message to the appropriate agent through the related 
employee.  
SA →Agnet: SSAprivate-key(ID, {ReceivedMsg}KSkey) 
 
11) The agent uses the USER-AGENTpublic-key 
encrypting and accessing the ReceivedDataMsg. The 
agent decrypts the ReceivedDataMsg by using the 
USER-AGENTpublic-key and checks it if it is legal. 
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Figure 2 - The process while receiving an email 
The Counter is a number which is increasing by one 
each time 
 
IF the ReceivedMsg is not illegal THEN 
     Comments= Counter 
ELSE  
     Comments=Violated RuleID + SecurityParameters 
END IF 
If the agent detects an illegal message, the SA is 
informed about the violated rule as well as the 
necessary security parameters to help SA decrypt the 
encrypted ReceivedMsg. 
Agent →SA: SAGENTprivate-key({Comments}KSkey, ID, 
Version) 
12) The SA confirms that he received the comments. 
This is a necessary step because a malicious user could 
prevent the message from step 11 reaching the SA. 
SA→Agent:SSAprivate-key({Comments}KSkey, ID, 
Version)  
13) If the ReceivedMsg is not illegal, the agent will 
give the ReceivedMsg to the user. Otherwise, the agent 
will not give it to the user. 
Agent →User: ReceivedMsg 
14) The user asks the SA to provide evidence showing 
to the user that the exchanged messages between the 
agent and the SA didn’t violate the privacy of the user 
User →SA: SUSERprivate-key(ID) 
15) The SA sends the evidence, where the user verifies 
whether the agent has violated (in step 5) the privacy 
of the user or not. 
SA→User:{SSAprivate-key(key,ID,Version)}KUSERpublic-
key 
 
3. Analysis 
Using steps 5 and 11, the user is able to determine if 
there has been a privacy violation on the part of the 
SA. If there is not clear proof that there was no privacy 
violation, the user can claim and prove to any third 
entity that the SA violated his privacy. We analyze 
both the send and receive procedures to indicate where 
the user might proof of, or the absence of proof of, a 
privacy violation. 
 
The user may have suspicions about a privacy 
violation during the communication by examining 
mainly the results of steps 3, 5 and 11. However the 
user can use the received key from the SA (in steps 8 
or 15) to find out whether there was a privacy violation 
or not. We divide the analysis into two parts. In the 
first part, we examine the send procedure and in the 
second part we examine the receive procedure.  
 
3.1 Send Procedure 
The following algorithm can be used by the user in 
order to verify whether there was a privacy violation or 
not during the send procedure. In order to explain the 
algorithm more clearly, we provide in brackets the 
number of the step in which we find the related 
information. E.g. key <5> refers to the key found in 
step 5. 
Let ExpectedMsg={DataMsg<4>}KSERVERpublic-key 
IF key<8> can decrypt {Msg,Flag}KSkey)<5> AND 
Msg=ExpectedMsg THEN 
The key<8> is the correct one 
IF the flag=0 THEN 
The Msg has been characterized as 
legal and the Msg has not been 
revealed to the SA (if the Msg was 
encrypted) 
ELSE 
The Msg has been characterized as 
illegal and the SA had access to the 
Msg. The Flag has the violated 
RuleID (one or more)  
END IF 
ELSE 
The key<8> is incorrect or the agent has encrypted 
the Msg in inappropriate way. Therefore, the user 
can take further actions by accusing the SA. 
END IF 
The user can verify the encrypted message found in 
step 3 by doing the following: The user encrypts the 
key<8> with the public key of the agent 
Let X= {key<8>}KAGENTpublic-key 
If X is equal to {key<3>}KAGENTpublic-key then key<8> 
is equal to key<3>. Although the user does not know 
the private key of the agent, he can verify the 
encrypted content of the message from step 3. The 
proposed technique offers confidentiality to the email 
however, the destination email address is known by the 
employer. 
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3.2 Receive Procedure 
A user who is receiving inappropriate email is not 
responsible for the exact message. However, an 
incoming inappropriate email will not reach the 
destination employee. The following algorithm can be 
used by the user in order to verify whether there was a 
privacy violation or not during the send procedure.  
IF {{ReceivedMsg}KSkey<10>}DSkey<15>= 
ReceivedMsg<13> THEN 
      key<10> = key<15> and ReceivedMsg<10> = 
ReceivedMsg<13> 
      X = {{Comments}KSkey<11>}DS key<15> 
      IF (X violates the privacy of the user AND  
      ReceivedMsg<13> does not violate any of the 
agreed rules) OR 
           {Comments}KSkey<11>!= 
{Comments}KSkey<12> THEN 
                  there is an unreasonable privacy violation 
      ELSE  No privacy violation exist 
ELSE there is an unreasonable privacy violation 
END IF 
 
3.3 Accusing the Agent/SA 
Once the user realizes that the agent acted 
maliciously, the user can accuse the SA. Even though 
the malicious actions were executed by the agent 
application, the owner of the agent is responsible for 
them. For this reason, a tamperproof technique offered 
by the agent can be helpful. In case the agent has sent 
an unexpected message, then the user can provide the 
related information (steps 3, 4, 5 and 8 for sending a 
message) to a third entity, such as the police, and prove 
that the agent has acted maliciously. If the user claims 
that the Msg<5> is not the expected (ExpectedMsg) 
then the police will ask the SA (or the agent) to provide 
evidence on how the agent has constructed the 
MSG<5>. The police may actually ask for information 
from step 4, where the user signs the message he 
wanted to send. Based on the message of step 4 and the 
key<5> (where key<5> is equal to key<8>), the Police 
can construct the expected message (ExpectedMsg). If 
the SA has no evidence, then the agent has acted 
maliciously. If the user claims to the police that he 
requested the key from the SA, and the SA did not give 
the correct key (based on the related ID), then the 
government authority can determine whether the user 
has this right or not, based on the information from 
steps 3 and 8. The police encrypts the key<8> with the 
public key of the agent (AGENTpublic-key). 
X= {key<8>}KAGENTpublic-key 
IF X is equal to {key}KAGENTpublic-key<3>, where 
ID<3>=ID<8>, THEN 
The key<8> is equal to key<3>; therefore the 
SA gave the correct key. 
ELSE The key<8> is not equal to key<3>; therefore 
the SA gave incorrect key. 
END IF 
 
4. Conclusion 
The desire of employers to detect the violation of 
company policy by employees along with privacy 
concerns of employees due to the measures taken by 
employers has raised an interesting problem. In this 
paper we introduced a technique which allows an 
employer to detect a policy violation related to a 
dishonest employee’s exchange of emails while at the 
same time, an honest employee can keep his/her 
exchanged emails private. Moreover, an employer may 
collect evidence about the malicious actions of 
dishonest employees while an employee can also 
accuse his/her employer in case the employer tries to 
violate the privacy of an honest employee. 
In further work, submitted elsewhere, we present 
several scenarios allowing us to extend these ideas, 
including a dynamic version of the solution. 
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